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Interoception, the ability to feel the body’s internal sensations, is an essential aspect
of emotional experience. There is mounting evidence that interoception is impaired
in common mental health disorders and that poor interoceptive awareness is a
major contributor to emotional reactivity, calling for clinical interventions to address
this deficit. The manuscript presents a comprehensive theoretical review, drawing
on multidisciplinary findings to propose a metatheory of reinforcement mechanisms
applicable across a wide range of disorders. We present a reconsideration of
operant conditioning through the co-emergence model of reinforcement, which is a
neurophenomenological account of the interaction between cognition and interoception,
and its consequences on behavior. The model suggests that during memory processing,
the retrieval of autobiographical memory (including maladaptive cognition) is dependent
upon its co-emerging interoceptive cues occurring at the encoding, consolidation
and reconsolidation stages. Accordingly, “interoceptive reinforcement” during emotional
distress is a common factor to all emotional disorders and a major cause for relapse.
We propose that interoceptive desensitization has transdiagnostic benefits, readily
achievable through the cultivation of equanimity during mindfulness training and can
be integrated in cognitive and behavioral interventions to permit a transdiagnostic
applicability. We summarize the contributions of this approach into 10 specific and
testable propositions.
Keywords: interoceptive desensitization, mindfulness, transdiagnostic, co-emergence model of reinforcement,
mindfulness-integrated cognitive behavior therapy, MiCBT, CMR
INTRODUCTION
Whereas exteroception refers to the sensory perception of non-self-referential stimuli, such as
seeing, smelling and hearing the external environment, interoception is the perception of the
body’s internal states through body sensations that one tends to associate with the sense of self
(Seth and Critchley, 2013). Interoception is now recognized to be a fundamental mechanism
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underlying motivation, emotion, social cognition and self-
awareness (Tsakiris and Critchley, 2016), and interoceptive
awareness is associated with individual differences in one’s ability
to inhibit behavior (Rae et al., 2019). There is also increasing
multidisciplinary evidence that interoception is predictably
impaired in mental health conditions and should be considered
as a transdiagnostic therapeutic target (Khalsa et al., 2018),
especially given that psychiatric patients do not completely
remit and at least 50% do not respond to standard treatments
(Leichsenring et al., 2019). Accordingly, therapy approaches
that emphasize interoceptive mechanisms are important to
consider and are likely to be central to future developments in
clinical interventions.
Interoceptive awareness and acceptance are central skills in
mindfulness meditation (Hart, 1987; Cayoun, 2011; Bornemann
et al., 2015; Hanley et al., 2017), and there is evidence supporting
the efficacy of mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs) in
common psychiatric disorders (Hedman-Lagerlöf et al., 2018).
Specifically, MBIs that emphasize interoceptive skills have been
shown to have beneficial transtherapeutic effects in both mental
and general health (Greeson et al., 2014; Farb et al., 2015;
Gibney et al., unpublished).
Most authors agree that mindfulness involves a purposeful
awareness of one’s experience, including interoceptive experience,
unfolding in the present moment, free from reactivity and
identification with the experience. Accordingly, mindfulness
methods are being increasingly used in clinical interventions on
the basis that they assist emotion regulation (Hölzel et al., 2011a;
Tang et al., 2015). For example, mindfulness of breath has been
shown to produce a generalized reduction in amygdala response
to emotional stimuli that is maintained during non-meditative
states (Desbordes et al., 2012). Several authors have proposed
that emotion regulation effects produced by mindfulness training
are largely due to training in executive control (e.g., Bishop
et al., 2004; Teper et al., 2013) and to the dynamic interaction
between cognitive and interoceptive processes (Cayoun, 2011;
Hölzel et al., 2011b). Mindfulness training has also been shown
to produce analgesic effects in chronic pain patients (Kabat-Zinn
et al., 1985; Zeidan and Vago, 2016; Cayoun et al., 2017) and with
acute experimental pain (Shires et al., 2020).
However, as also noted by others (e.g., Gibson, 2019),
under the umbrella of ‘mindfulness interventions,’ the methods
that patients are asked to practice can differ greatly because
the original instructions from traditional Buddhist teachings,
which are already diverse, have been modified to varying
degrees to adapt to various mental health conditions and
clinical populations (e.g., Linehan, 1993; Kristeller and Hallett,
1999; Segal et al., 2002; Bowen et al., 2009). Some of
these adaptations have prioritized certain mindfulness skills
(e.g., exteroceptive awareness) and deemphasized others (e.g.,
interoceptive awareness and equanimity) to increase congruence
with the targeted symptomatology. It is not clear whether
such diagnostic-specific adaptations affect therapy outcomes
given the central role of interoception in a wide range of
mental health disorders. While it is well established that
core mindfulness principles can be used for a wide range of
symptoms and conditions (Keng et al., 2011; Greeson et al.,
2014; Cayoun et al., 2019), the active mechanisms that permit
a transdiagnostic benefit are not well translated into clinical
applications (Grabovac et al., 2011).
Accordingly, we first operationalize mindfulness in behavioral
terms and review some of the key findings suggesting that
mindfulness practice enhances emotion regulation. We then
integrate these observations through the co-emergence model
of reinforcement (CMR), which is a neurophenomenological
account of operant conditioning initially proposed by Cayoun
(2011). We describe how the model provides a more accurate
and integrated account of behavior reinforcement, which also
explains how the mechanisms of action in mindfulness help
decrease the typical symptoms of emotional disorders. We
will then discuss the involvement of interoception in the
encoding, storage and retrieval of emotional memory and the
benefits that mindfulness meditation can provide in reprocessing
autobiographical memory through interoceptive awareness and
equanimity. We reconceptualize emotional disorders as an over-
identification with, and inability to extinguish, the interoceptive
memory trace associated with the disorder. We then describe how




Mindfulness is the usual translation of the Pali word sati, which
is suggested to mean ‘remembering with wisdom,’ sati-nepakkena
in Pali (Levman, 2017). As traditionally taught in the Theravada
tradition of Buddhist psychology, mindfulness is a means to an
end, cultivating wisdom and reducing suffering, rather than a
goal in itself (Gethin, 2011). It is understood as a mental skillset
or ‘tool of investigation’ to be developed in order to decrease
suffering by cultivating one’s insight into the impermanence of
all phenomena, including the sense of self. This is done in part
by decreasing one’s identification with one’s sense of self, which
is encountered subjectively through meditation in the form of
thoughts and body sensations arising and passing in conscious
awareness (Hart, 1987; Bodhi, 2000; Grabovac et al., 2011).
During mindfulness of breath meditation, trainees first learn
to sustain attention on their breath and learn to recognize
thoughts that emerge spontaneously in consciousness, inhibit
the tendency to identify with, and react to, these thoughts, and
refocus attention on the breath as soon as possible (Brahm,
2006; Nanamoli and Bodhi, 2009). Trainees inhibit the learned
response (to engage with the thought) only; they do not inhibit
the thought itself. In Western applications of mindfulness, this
process has also been termed “decentering” (Williams et al.,
2000). This includes inhibiting the aversion that one might
experience when being distracted by thoughts while trying to
focus on the breath during meditation. Some authors have
proposed that this practice requires, besides curiosity and an
accepting attitude, the training of at least three higher order
executive functions: (1) sustained attention on a target (breath)
while holding the task in mind, (2) response inhibition to
intrusive stimuli (e.g., thoughts and images) and (3) cognitive
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flexibility through shifting attention back to the target; the breath
(Bishop et al., 2004; Cayoun, 2011). Rather than trying to modify
the content of thoughts, trainees develop a degree of inhibitory
control over the processes that proliferate thinking, allowing a
progressive reduction of intrusive thoughts (Segal et al., 2002;
Bishop et al., 2004).
With the widely used Theravada teaching in the Burmese
Vipassana tradition of Ledi Sayadaw, U Ba Khin and S. N. Goenka
(Ledi, 1965/1999; Hart, 1987), once concentration has been
sufficiently developed, the emphasis of effort is on developing
interoceptive awareness and equanimity. This requires passing
one’s attention (‘scan’) systematically throughout the body,
starting with small sections at a time, feeling body sensations,
accepting them unconditionally, and moving attention to the
adjacent part, to cultivate an increasing ability for interoceptive
awareness and acceptance. Meditators also train to inhibit their
habit of identifying with body sensations and their habitual
responses associated with hedonic tone (pleasant, neutral and
unpleasant experiences). This enables a progressive ability to
perceive phenomena more objectively – as impermanent and
therefore impersonal – and with less reliance on preconceived
ideas and emotional reactivity. Since body sensations are
considered to be the basic building blocks of emotions (Barrett,
2006), preventing reactivity to body sensations helps regulate
emotions (Hart, 1987; Cayoun et al., 2019).
Accordingly, mindfulness meditation practiced in this way, for
at least two millennia (Analayo, 2006), has been operationalized
in behavioral terms as an exposure to internally generated stimuli
(thoughts images and body sensations) that requires a deliberate
effort to prevent the conditioned response to both distressing and
pleasurable cues, and the development of greater objectivity (less
reliance on mental representations) and ‘equanimity’ (Cayoun,
2011; Hölzel et al., 2011b; Farb et al., 2015). Equanimity has
been defined as “an even-minded mental state or dispositional
tendency toward all experiences or objects, regardless of their
affective valence (pleasant, unpleasant or neutral) or source”
(Desbordes et al., 2015, p. 357).
THE CO-EMERGENCE MODEL OF
REINFORCEMENT
It has been repeatedly shown that the experience of emotion
is determined by interoception (Garfinkel and Critchley, 2012;
Damasio and Carvalho, 2013; Seth and Critchley, 2013; Pistoia
et al., 2015). Barrett (2006) noted that the interoceptive quality
of affect is “a basic, invariant building block of emotional life
that can be observed in self-reports of experience as well as
in virtually all instrument-based measures of emotion” (p. 50).
There is considerable evidence that interoception is associated
with activation of various regions of the insular cortex (Craig,
2003), especially the anterior insula (Menon and Uddin, 2010;
Garfinkel and Critchley, 2012), although exceptions have been
observed (Damasio and Carvalho, 2013; see also Uddin, 2014,
for a review). With regards to neural correlates of emotional
awareness, there are indications of dynamic interactions between
interoceptive cues of emotion and attention in the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC), linking attention and response selection
to interoception (Lane et al., 1998). Taken together, these studies
suggest that emotion is felt within the framework of the body,
with thinking and feeling co-emerging and depending on one
another to manufacture behavior, as outlined by the CMR.
The CMR is a unifying approach to behavior maintenance
and change that integrates elements of cognitive neuroscience,
learning theory, and the ‘five aggregates,’ the essential human
information processing framework expressed in the Buddhist
psychological system (Narada, 1968; Nyanaponika, 1996; Bodhi,
2000). Since emotional reactivity is both a common life
experience and a transdiagnostic process in most psychological
disorders (Feldman et al., 2015), its behavioral representation
must be as generally applicable as possible. Accordingly, the CMR
is necessarily generic to permit transdiagnostic applicability.
In line with this purpose, it is presented here as simply as
possible, by means of four generic functional components
(for more comprehensive descriptions, see Cayoun, 2011 and
Cayoun et al., 2019).
Basic Principles of Equilibrium States
The non-pathological functioning of the model components
is presented in Figure 1. The model suggests that stimuli
perceived as personally significant are encoded interoceptively
before behavioral output is determined, in line with mechanisms
of interoceptive salience proposed by Menon and Uddin (2010)
and Uddin (2014), as per the following sequence. Once an
external or internal stimulus (Stimulus in Figure 1) has been
perceived through the senses (Sensory Perception in Figure 1),
it is categorized and processed through evaluative filters of
self-referential relevance, such as personal values, beliefs and
schematic models, autobiographical memories, personality traits,
perceived needs, and cultural predispositions (Evaluation in
Figure 1). As a rough guide, their expression is often preceded
by pronouns such as “I,” “my,” “me,” “ours” (e.g., I am sure people
at work think I can’t cope”). These can be implicitly embedded in
“you,” “your,” “yours” and “theirs,” when comparisons with self-
references are made. This evaluative process may be conscious,
especially when processing novel or complex stimuli (e.g., “I
realize that I am not very good with statistics”), or more rapid and
subconscious/automatic when the need for conscious updates in
evaluation is unnecessary.
Evaluations can be placed on a continuum of self-reference, in
terms of perceived personal importance. Self-reference includes
stimuli associated with one’s sense of self and its associations (e.g.,
one’s views); it is not limited to one’s immediate or past personal
experiences. Toward one end of the continuum, evaluations are
increasingly descriptive in nature, neutral, and stimuli appear as
least personally important. Toward the other end, evaluations are
self-referential in nature and contain likes and dislikes associated
with personal judgment and affect. This is congruent with
Teasdale and Barnard (1993) multi-level interactive cognitive
subsystems model of cognitive architecture, where a ‘central
engine’ processes ‘propositional’ (factual) and ‘implicational’
(self-referential) thoughts.
Central to the CMR is that self-referential evaluations ‘co-
emerge’ simultaneously with body sensations (Co-emergent
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FIGURE 1 | Components of the co-emergence model of reinforcement during equilibrium in information processing (adapted from Cayoun, 2011). The response is
a direct consequence of interoceptive experience and is not directly dependent upon the stimulus or cognitive evaluation. The arrow with a dotted line represents a
faster route, which serves to process highly automated and instinctive signals (e.g., survival reflexes), where associations between the perception of the stimulus and
the interoceptive “meaning” no longer appears to require evaluative processing.
Interoception in Figure 1), whereby the more a stimulus is
evaluated as being personally important, the more intense the
co-emerging body sensation. The term ‘co-emergence’ refers
to the experience that thinking and feeling are occurring
simultaneously, even though there may be a short and often
indistinguishable firing delay between the two neural substrates
that subserve these functions. Note that interoceptive experiences
that precede Evaluation (e.g., sudden pain or cold sensation
due to cold weather) are non-co-emergent internal stimuli, as
they pertain to the Stimulus component. Moreover, the hedonic
tone of co-emerging interoception (valence) is determined by
the agreeableness of the evaluation. The more agreeable an
evaluation, the more pleasant the co-emerging interoceptive
experience is likely to be. Likewise, least agreeable evaluations co-
emerge with the most unpleasant body sensations. The findings of
Barrett and other emotion theorists also share the view that ‘core
valence,’ in terms of the interoceptive hedonic tone of mood, is an
invariant property of emotional life that integrates an evaluation
system (Russell, 2003; Barrett et al., 2004; Barrett, 2006). They
propose that interoceptive valence derives from the psychological
process of ‘valuation,’ defined as “a simple form of meaning
analysis in which something is judged as helpful or harmful in
a given instance, producing some change in core affective state
[and] judgments about whether stimuli or events are helpful
or harmful, rewarding or threatening, help to influence the
valence property of core affect” (Barrett, 2006, p. 39). Self-
referential evaluations and their co-emerging interoception are
stored and subsequently retrieved in a co-emergent way, as will
be discussed later.
The fourth function of the CMR is the response (Reaction
in Figure 1), which is dependent upon the intensity and
quality (hedonic tone) of body sensations. The proposition that
self-referential evaluation and interoception combine to guide
behavior is supported by several studies of the neurobiological
bases of emotion (e.g., Lane et al., 1998; Gerber et al., 2008).
Note that a reaction can be constrained in cognition, as
in obsessive and ruminative thinking, or making a rational
decision. Unless trained to respond otherwise with methods that
promote equanimity, reactivity is a function of interoceptive
intensity. The more a body sensation is intense, the more likely
it is that a covert or overt reaction will occur, irrespective
of whether the sensation is pleasant or unpleasant. With
regards to the type of reaction, the CMR proposes that
it is a function of hedonic tone. The more pleasant a
body sensation, the more likely it is to lead to attachment
and a desire for more. Unpleasant body sensations tend to
lead to any form of experiential avoidance. Reinforcement
occurs once the response serves to either decrease unpleasant
sensations (negative reinforcement) or increase pleasant ones
(positive reinforcement). Once a response has occurred, it
feeds back into Sensory Perception and does not require
exteroceptive information to maintain continuity of information
processing. This closed loop formation is easily noticeable
during maladaptive cognitive and metacognitive processing,
such as ruminative thinking and worry about worry, typical
of generalized anxiety disorder. As suggested by Barrett (2006,
p. 40), “the intensity of a core affective experience results
in a perceived urgency to act,” an observation supported
by several studies (e.g., Barrett, 2004; Barrett et al., 2004;
Barrett and Niedenthal, 2004).
In standard operant conditioning (Skinner, 1953), learning
takes place when the behavior ‘operates’ on the environment to
generate consequences. Behavior is either increased or decreased
by the organism as a function of the resulting consequence of that
behavior. If the behavior leads to a desired outcome (a rewarding
‘consequence’), the organism is likely to increase the frequency
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of the behavior. If the behavior leads to an undesired outcome
(a non-rewarding or punishing consequence), the organism is
likely to decrease the frequency of the behavior. This approach
gives minimal, if any, consideration for the role of internal
contexts, such as cognition and interoception. In contrast, the
CMR suggests that the consequence on which the next behavior
operates is the change in interoceptive feedback, and is not
dependent on an external consequence caused by the previous
behavior. Hence, the CMR proposes that we do not react directly
to external triggers; we react according to the sensation we feel
consciously or subconsciously in the body.
Neurologically, this mechanism is likely to be attributable
to the salience network, forming important linkages between
the anterior insula and the anterior cingulate that function to
segregate the most relevant among internal and extra-personal
stimuli to guide behavior (Menon and Uddin, 2010). There
is recognition that this network is of fundamental importance
for mental life (Medford and Critchley, 2010). In particular,
interoceptive signals produced in the dorsal anterior insular
cortex play a key role in assigning significance to stimuli in
daily experiences (Damasio, 1999; Critchley et al., 2004; Uddin,
2014; Goodkind et al., 2015). There is also some evidence of
ongoing synchronized functionality between the default mode
network and salience networks (Doll et al., 2015), which may
be reflected in the CMR by the continual interaction between
Evaluation and Co-emerging Interoception. The notion that
learned responses rely on interoceptive experience, even when
the stimulus is external to the person, differentiates this approach
from the conventional understanding of behavior reinforcement.
It follows that these mechanisms apply to other types of
conditioning modalities, such as observational learning and
classical conditioning. As such, all learning principles rely on
the co-emergence of cognition and interoception. This alone has
significant implications for clinical interventions where exposure
therapy is recommended.
System in Disequilibrium and
Psychopathology
The four processing components are in a state of disequilibrium
during a stressful experience. ‘Disequilibrium’ in this context
means that the balance between components necessary for
optimum cognitive and emotional functioning is disrupted by
the additional processing demand of some components at the
cost of processing capacity of others. When a person is distressed,
attention resources are depleted from sensory processes (Sensory
Perception and Co-emergent Interoception) and reallocated to
Evaluation and Reaction, creating a functional disequilibrium
between components. This is pictorially represented through the
case examples in Figures 2, 3 by larger boxes for expanded
processing and smaller boxes for depleted processing. These are
examples of a disequilibrium state for patients with a complex
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Figure 2 shows the CMR
description of a 23-year-old male, manual laborer with complex
PTSD and substance use disorder. Figure 3 shows the CMR
description of a 38-year-old male, unemployed with complex
PTSD and persistent depressive disorder.
Inflated reactivity prevents full access to sensory perception,
as exemplified by dissociative states during experiences of
anxiety. This is supported by findings that basic sensory ability
correlates negatively with stress (Posserud et al., 2004) and
both high-arousal negative emotions (e.g., fear and anxiety)
and pleasure through appetitive arousal (e.g., food and sexual
reward) have a narrowing effect on attentional scope and
conceptual attention is also reduced by high attachment states
(Friedman and Forster, 2010). In other words, whether intense
interoceptive cues are associated with aversion or craving, the
scope of attentional capacity narrows. This corresponds to
depleted Sensory Perception in Figures 2, 3. In contrast, positive
emotional states that do not involve craving (e.g., a sense
of happiness) have an expansive effect on attentional scope
(Friedman and Forster, 2010). This corresponds to the system
in equilibrium state, where the Sensory Perception component
functions at full capacity (Figure 1). This lack of perceptual
effectiveness limits the accuracy of perceptual ability and leads
to an overreliance on assumptions (Evaluation) held in memory,
such as cognitive schemas.
There are also indications that at a biological level,
reinforcement depends on the ability of the nucleus accumbens
(NAc) to predict an outcome (O’Doherty et al., 2004). Indeed,
both conditioned reward and conditioned aversion are associated
with the activation of the NAc, which can encode differentially
the hedonic value of the same stimulus based on learned
associations (Roitman et al., 2010). As such, an important aspect
of reinforcement is the influence of context, which can be nicely
illustrated by the following case example of a person experiencing
radically different hedonic values of the same stimulus (pain)
based on learned associations. Consider two different situations
in which the same person encounters the same experience of
physical pain, one due to domestic violence and the other to
masochistic sexual behavior. In both situations, a disequilibrium
state is expected. The nervous system depletes attention from
the more objective sensory appraisal networks and reallocates
attention to the learned meaning of the stimulus, which leads to
radically different co-emerging body sensations, and presumably
opposite reactions. When the person experiences physical pain
(Stimulus) caused by domestic violence, the unpleasant body
sensations that co-emerge with the negative evaluation of what
is happening leads to an aversive response in an attempt to
decrease the duration and frequency of unpleasant co-emerging
body sensations. In contrast, when the person experiences the
same physical pain (Stimulus), but caused by masochistic sex, he
or she will interpret it as pleasant because of its association with
a safe and agreeable context. The pleasant body sensations that
co-emerge with the positive evaluation then leads to a craving
response in an attempt to increase the duration and frequency of
co-emerging pleasant hedonic tone; the ‘reward.’ The significance
of context in conditioning principles has been highlighted by
others (e.g., Hayes et al., 2002).
A non-pathological disequilibrium state reflects only a
transient reallocation of resources that may serve a survival
purpose by allowing the rapid evaluation of potential threats
and immediate deployment of defensive reactivity, in line with
the function of the salience network (Menon and Uddin, 2010;
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FIGURE 2 | Representation of a disequilibrium state for a young man with a history of trauma, criminal history, drug and alcohol problems and self-harm. Sensory
perception of the situation is depleted and therefore contaminated by evaluative and self-referential cognitions. Note that his behavior (Inflated Reaction) is reinforced
because it reduces his numbness and other interoceptive discomfort.
FIGURE 3 | Representation of a disequilibrium state in a middle-aged man with a history of childhood physical abuse and dysregulated mood. In this case too,
sensory perception of the situation is depleted and contaminated by intrusive fearful memories, leading to self-referential cognitions. His reaction (avoidance of
sensory cues) is reinforced by the prevention of dissociative and other interoceptive discomfort.
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Uddin, 2014). For instance, when a stimulus is ambiguous
but could be threatening, rapid retrieval and use of mental
representations of the stimulus replaces the actual sensory
perception of the stimulus. In other words, “what it is” is replaced
with “what it is like,” and often “what it is like for me,” producing
spontaneous co-emerging interoception of which the individual
may not be aware. He or she then reacts, immediately assuming
that the internal experience is an accurate measure of what
the stimulus represents. This is proposed to be invariant across
situations and is not limited to ambiguities or threats. The model
suggests that the same principle applies to pleasant situations,
such as infatuation and appetitive behavior.
In pathological states of disequilibrium, the model posits
that the increased processing of self-referential cognition and
reactivity, and the reduced capacity to process sensory signals,
is learned and sustained beyond the reasonable need for
reactivity. The individual identifies this state as their own.
Some of the cognitive and behavioral correlates of pathological
disequilibrium include dissociative states (markedly depleted
Sensory Perception and co-emergent Interoception), ruminative
and catastrophic thinking and self-preoccupation, accompanied
by over-reactivity, such as impulsivity and avoidance (markedly
inflated Evaluation and Reaction). What defines a pathological
state of disequilibrium is both the extent or ‘severity’ of the
disequilibrium, and its persistence over time, reflected in the
degree of impaired functioning in daily life. In particular, a
lack of interoceptive awareness and equanimity contributes
to relapse into emotional disorders and chronicity, which
in turn contributes to the maintenance or worsening of
dysfunctional personality traits. A sustained disequilibrium
state is thought to lead to self-identification with this state,
habituation, and eventually a sense of normality in being over-
judgmental and over-reactive, and less aware of interoceptive and
other sensory cues.
One of the clinical predictions of this model is that the
more established and pronounced the disequilibrium state,
the more likely it is to initiate or maintain psychopathology.
This mechanism is supported by the growing multidisciplinary
findings of depleted interoception and inflated self-referential
cognition (e.g., rumination) in mental health disorders (Farb
et al., 2010; Khalsa et al., 2018). For instance, studies show
a consistent pattern of impaired interoception in depression
and associated somatic comorbidities, and indicates that the
core symptoms of depression may be caused by disrupted
interoceptive-exteroceptive integration (Harshaw, 2015).
People with major depressive disorder show bilateral decreased
activation in the dorsolateral insula during an interoceptive
attention task (Avery et al., 2014). There are also indications that
high levels of ruminative brooding in depressive and anxious
states (overinflated Evaluation and Reaction in Figures 2, 3)
are associated with decreased interoceptive awareness (i.e.,
depleted Sensory Perception and Co-emergent Interoception
in Figures 2, 3) (Lackner and Fresco, 2016). Moreover, two
studies investigated the interoceptive capacity of individuals
with differing degrees of suicidality (Forrest et al., 2015).
The authors found an impaired interoceptive capacity in
individuals with suicidality compared to controls, and access
to interoception decreased as a function of symptom severity.
These studies are consistent with the accumulating evidence
of abnormal functioning of specific subdivisions of the insula
within the salience network, which is a feature of numerous
neuropsychiatric disorders (Uddin, 2014; Goodkind et al.,
2015; Peters et al., 2016), as suggested by the CMR in chronic
disequilibrium state.
Recreating Equilibrium
Another central tenet of the CMR is that as disequilibrium can
be learned, it can also be unlearned. Restoration of a more
balanced state between components assists in the extinguishment
of unhelpful behavior, helps prevent relapse through minimizing
reactivity to interoceptive cues, and reduces the underlying
neural activation associated with disequilibrium states. Recent
psychophysiological studies using inhibition tasks show that
increasing interoceptive awareness improved both unintentional
and intentional response inhibition (Rae et al., 2018, 2019).
During mindfulness meditation, by focusing on (‘scanning’)
body sensations (increased interoceptive processing) while
remaining equanimous (decreased self-referential judgments
and reactivity) during regular mindfulness meditation, one can
recreate equilibrium between imbalanced components. Support
for this proposition comes from studies showing that emotional
reactivity is associated with increased self-referent evaluations
and the suppression of viscerosomatic networks (disequilibrium
state), whereas the practice of mindfulness activates networks that
help balance the regulatory responses to emotions, while allowing
non-sensory visceral information to be experienced (equilibrium
state) (Farb et al., 2007, 2010; Avery et al., 2014; Tomasino
and Fabbro, 2016). Experienced mindfulness meditators show
enhanced activation of interoceptive representations in the
insular and somatosensory cortices (Lazar et al., 2005; Hölzel
et al., 2008).
Accordingly, we suggest that mindfulness meditation teaches
ideal skills for the purpose of promoting equilibrium between
components of information processing reflected in the CMR.
We also suggest that the CMR can be both a useful rationale
for using mindfulness training in clinical practice and a
convenient means of operationalizing the active mechanisms of
mindfulness training. This is supported by an investigation of
mindfulness mechanisms comparing non-meditators (n = 284)
with meditators (n = 386) trained in a variety of mindfulness
methods and traditions, which showed greater body awareness
and non-reactivity in meditators (Cebolla et al., 2017). A recent
study also examined the effects of three most commonly used
meditation methods used during mindfulness interventions
(mindfulness of breath, body scanning and loving-kindness
meditations) on the levels of mindfulness, concentration,
self-compassion, emotional regulation and experience, and
life satisfaction (Kropp and Sedlmeier, 2019). The authors
found that body scanning meditation showed greater effects
on almost all dependent variables than those in the other
meditation conditions. These studies support our observations
that interoceptive awareness and inhibitory control are key
mechanisms in mindfulness practice. This point was recently
emphasized by Gibson (2019), whose review shows that it
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may be more accurate to link many of the identified benefits
of mindfulness practice to increased interoception and its
neurological correlates.
PROPOSED ROLES OF CO-EMERGENCE
IN MEMORY PROCESSES
Since conditioning principles are heavily reliant on memory, we
now discuss the roles of co-emergence principles in memory
to provide a broader integration of co-emergent information
processing. In particular, the CMR puts forward several
propositions that have implications for clinical interventions,
especially where autobiographical memories contribute to
symptom proliferation.
Co-emergent Encoding and Retrieval
The first postulate is that experiences that involve self-referential
(including schema-based) processing are encoded in memory,
and later retrieved, co-emergently, i.e., with concomitant
conscious or non-conscious body sensations. This is easily
observed in people with PTSD, where intrusive traumatic
memories co-emerge with viscerosomatic sensations, creating a
distressing sense of ‘nowness’ (Nader, 2015; Payne et al., 2015).
Whether a person’s mood can serve as a distinctive interoceptive
context for learning and retrieval of memory is not a novel
question in cognitive science. Mood-dependent memory research
emerged over 40 years ago through the work of Bower et al.
(1978), and has shown that the emotional valence associated with
a memory target at the encoding stage can serve as a retrieval cue.
Accordingly, Bower et al. (1981) proposed that an emotion is a
unit within a semantic network that encodes memories.
Recent fMRI studies confirmed this observation. Xu et al.
(2014) found that the practice of non-directive meditation
triggers spontaneous episodic memory and emotional processing.
Pais-Vieira et al. (2016) explored how attention oriented to
interoception and exteroception during emotional experience
can differentially influence memory encoding and recall. They
found evidence that paying attention to interoceptive cues of
emotion promotes the formation of emotional memory through
the activation of brain networks associated with interoceptive
awareness of emotion, such as anterior insula and dorsal ACC.
This is consistent with Menon and Uddin (2010) salience
network, which may be part of the neural structures that subserve
the dynamics of co-emergence. Pais-Vieira et al. (2016) results
demonstrate that interoceptive attention promotes the retrieval
of emotional memory.
Additionally, the CMR implies that the co-emergence of self-
referential evaluations with interoceptive cues subsequently help
recognize personally important stimuli during the course of a
lifetime. This is proposed to be a fundamental principle for
the formation and perpetuation of schemas; the maintenance of
unhelpful schemas relies on reactivity to body sensations. We
reason that such reactivity can persist when the chosen therapy
does not take interoception sufficiently into account, increasing
the probability of relapse. Since one reacts to, or because of,
body sensations (Hart, 1987), not being sufficiently aware of them
leads to schema-based evaluations and automatic reactivity, as
exemplified above in Figures 2, 3.
This conceptualization implies that since all significant life
events, including schema-related and trauma memories, are
encoded and stored with co-emergent body sensations, scanning
the body with equanimity during mindfulness meditation is
also ‘scanning through our past’; our ‘dormant’ autobiographical
memories which can be reactivated through the interoceptive
stimulation triggered by ‘scanning’ the body. Allowing the full
emergence of interoceptive experience during body scanning
leads to experiencing sensations that are sufficiently similar to
those experienced in the past, capable of acting as memory
cues for past emotions—many of which operate below the
level of conscious awareness. Based on the CMR, remaining
aware of body sensations and equanimous, while not identifying
with the experience and observing it for what it is, maintains
an equilibrium state and extinguishes the reactive response.
We propose that cognitive schemas are experienced co-
emergently and that some of the reported benefits of practicing
body-scanning methods during mindfulness meditation are
attributable to the desensitization of such schemas through
interoceptive exposure.
Recall Facilitation Through Interoception
The second postulate is that the probability of retrieval in
autobiographical memory is proportional to the intensity of
interoception that co-emerged at the encoding stage; although
the amount of memory reconsolidation over time will also
affect decay (Tronson et al., 2006). Nader (2015) noted
that the significance of a memory facilitates remembrance,
as understood from over five decades of memory research.
For instance, early studies which examined people’s memory
for materials that evoked emotional reactions of differing
intensities showed that memory retrieval of an event increases
with the emotional intensity experienced at the time of
that event (Kanungo and Dutta, 1966; Dutta and Kanungo,
1975). The specific relationship between interoceptive awareness
and processing and emotional memory was more recently
demonstrated through psychophysiological studies (e.g., Pollatos
et al., 2005, 2007; Pollatos and Schandry, 2007), which provide
support for the notion that memory retrieval is a function of
interoceptive intensity.
Even in severe traumatic conditions where patients are
not always capable of accurately or fully recalling obvious
features of the traumatic experience, poor recall is likely to
be associated with poor encoding. Experiencing a dissociative
state during the traumatic event prevents the co-emerging
interoceptive experience that would usually accompany such
an event. The CMR explains this in terms of disequilibrium
state, whereby attention in both Sensory Perception and Co-
emerging Interoception components is most severely depleted,
limiting one’s ability to fully feel the emotional content
of the experience. The experience of dissociation, such as
numbness, during traumatic events is well documented (e.g.,
van IJizendoorn and Schuengel, 1996; Dutra et al., 2009). In
turn, reduced interoception causes poor memory retrieval, as
noted by Immordino-Yang and Damasio (2007).
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Co-emergent Encoding Prevents Decay
The third postulate is that memory retention is a function of co-
emergence mechanisms and is aligned to evolution and survival
needs. While propositional (non-self-referential) memories, such
as the brand of an ordinary car that belongs to someone else, are
not usually perceived as important to remember, remembering
to pick-up the children from school is. In the former case,
the memory of the unimportant stimulus is not encoded with
sufficiently intense co-emerging body sensations, making it
more prone to decay. In contrast, in the latter case, provided
our children are important to us (‘my children,’ part of me),
the encoding includes co-emergent interoceptive cues and is
therefore thought to activate insular and subcortical networks.
The evidence that memory consolidation relies on interoceptive
activation in the insular cortex was provided by several studies
(Bermudez-Rattoni et al., 2005; Contreras et al., 2012; Bermudez-
Rattoni, 2014).
Accordingly, we are proposing that the depth of neural
network activation decreases the likelihood of forgetting
information that was deemed important at the encoding stage
of memory. This includes all stimuli associated with survival
needs, whether in the form of threats or means of reproduction.
More neutral memories do not need to rely on emotional
(interoceptive) cues to prevent decay and require mnemonic
strategies to survive, such as rehearsal. It is well demonstrated
that emotional memories trigger mechanisms that modulate
consolidation, whereas neutral memories fail to do so (McGaugh,
2004; Nader, 2015).
We hypothesize that one of the main purposes served by
co-emergent encoding is to assist survival by decreasing the
probability of memory decay and permitting successful memory
retrieval of what is perceived as personally important (e.g., threat
recognition and other survival needs). Updates on whether a
memory that should remain personally important can be made
as often as necessary, either through reconsolidation processes or
through preventing them (Nader et al., 2000; Nader and Hardt,
2009). This allows each individual to maintain or ‘outgrow’
and relinquish unnecessary emotional memories, such as those
of childhood trauma. During mindfulness meditation, if the
practitioner is accurately trained to develop equanimity while
feeling body sensations, potential spontaneous recall of painful
memories will not only appear acceptable, they will also provide
a context for desensitization and eventually neutralization of
learned reactivity to distress cues (Kerr et al., 2013; Cayoun, 2015;
Hölzel et al., 2016). Clinical interventions that use interoceptive
exposure to desensitize traumatic memories show tangible
benefits (Leitch, 2007; Parker et al., 2008; Payne et al., 2015) and
improved functional connectivity between the salience network,
the default mode network and the ACC (Boyd et al., 2017).
CO-EMERGENCE MODEL INTEGRATION
WITHIN THERAPY
General Implications for Therapy
We propose that the unlearning process of an established
disequilibrium state is inherent in mindfulness meditation and
is a ‘transtherapeutic’ mechanism (Greeson et al., 2014) that
can be embedded in most clinical interventions, including crisis
intervention and chronic pain treatment (e.g., Cayoun et al.,
2017; Mozafari-Motlagh et al., 2019). As put forward by the CMR,
since reactivity is reinforced by its consequence on interoception
(Cayoun, 2011), interoceptive awareness and inhibitory control
promote interoceptive desensitization and behavior change.
This was clearly demonstrated by behavioral studies pioneering
interoceptive desensitization in panic disorder, and the numerous
studies which have since been carried out across a range of
anxiety disorders (see Boettcher et al., 2016, for a review).
These studies led to the conclusion that interoceptive exposure
can be used as a transdiagnostic intervention (Boswell et al.,
2013) and constitutes an important active mechanism in Eustis
et al.’s (2020) Unified Protocol for anxiety disorder. However,
Boettcher and Barlow (2019) also found that interoceptive
exposure implemented on its own for claustrophobia was less
effective than the same for panic disorder, and that situational
exposure was also required to decrease claustrophobia symptoms.
Their results showed that interoceptive exposure on its own
was most effective when the feared trigger was generated
internally, whereas externally generated fear triggers, such as
social cues, also require exposure to external situations. While the
idiosyncrasies of a disorder guide the direction for the contextual
applications of the model (e.g., exposure to perceived dirt in
the case of obsessive-compulsive disorder), the fundamental
principle remains the same for emotional disorders: the central
mechanism of distress is a disequilibrium state. If a person’s
psychological disorder is case-conceptualized in terms of a more
or less established disequilibrium state, a congruent intervention
is one that attempts to re-establish equilibrium, irrespective
of the disorder.
There are two important clinical implications of this
conceptualization. One is that all mental health disorders benefit
from interoceptive exposure, where patients are exposed to their
body sensations while not identifying with them and prevent
their learned reactions. The other is that learning to notice the
incessant flow of co-emergence of ‘mind and body,’ including
how an unhelpful thought co-emerges with an unpleasant body-
sensation, promotes well-being and the prevention of relapse.
The CMR posits that since ‘relapsing’ involves the reactivation
of a past disequilibrium state from memory, it ‘reconsolidates’
the disorder’s memory trace. Hence, we reconceptualize recurrent
relapses as a consequence of the inability to extinguish the co-
emergent memory trace of the disorder (i.e., how unpleasant or
numb it feels in the body when one thinks about the world in a
certain way, and how one usually reacts in order to feel relieved).
This also implies ‘living in the past.’ Hence, the CMR is a viable
multidisciplinary rationale for the integration of mindfulness
skills, such as interoceptive desensitization, in standard therapies.
Another important implication is the reconceptualization of
the focus of therapy. A hypothesis implied in the CMR is
that the increased generalization and worsening of unhelpful
behavior, such as avoidance or hypervigilance, is a function
of a strengthening disequilibrium state. It follows that, with
time, such reinforced disequilibrium state will affect other
areas of life functioning. This is often shared by patients with
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generalized anxiety disorder, who explain that their anxiety
started with mild OCD or trauma symptoms earlier in their
life and eventually generalized to multiple contexts over the
years. When the disequilibrium state has become pervasive
across time and context, the psychopathology is either considered
to be ‘chronic’ or the expression of a disordered personality.
Conditions such as borderline personality disorder, for example,
are good reflections of a pervasive disequilibrium state. In this
case, it may be better called a disequilibrium trait because the
person over-identifies with being inflexibly over-judgmental and
over-reactive, perceiving disequilibrium as normality.
Nonetheless, in contrast with conventional belief that
personality factors remain consistent across time and
context, we suggest that they can change through targeting
their maintaining factor, hypothesized in the CMR as the
subconscious continual reinforcement of disequilibrium state
and its neurobiological substrate. This view is supported by
studies of mindfulness methods that emphasize interoceptive
exposure and non-identification with body sensations as the core
of the practice, which is a fundamental skillsets traditionally
taught in mindfulness meditation, known as ‘contemplation of
feeling’ (Hart, 1987; Walshe, 2012)—note that ‘feeling’ here refers
to interoception. Change in personality factors was observed in
a recent study of violent male offenders (N = 403), showing that
mindfulness, alexithymia, and empathy significantly explained an
incremental amount of variance in traits of antisocial personality
disorder in separate regression analyses (Velotti et al., 2019).
Reappraisal Facilitation
The ability to reappraise emotional reactivity during aversive
events is an important aspect of both crisis intervention and
relapse prevention, because it is central to healthy emotion
regulation. However, reappraisal attempts alone seem to be
minimally effective in decreasing the activation of limbic regions
and associated emotional reactivity (Craig, 2002). From a co-
emergence point of view, this may be partly due to the
reduced ability to perceive stimuli accurately during a stressful
experience (e.g., Friedman and Forster, 2010; Kang et al., 2013),
as represented in the model by depleted Sensory Perception in
a disequilibrium state (Figures 2, 3). Poor access to accurate
perception leads to misinterpretations (inflated Evaluation in
Figures 2, 3). Importantly, poor ability to reappraise during
distress may also be due to a lack of interoceptive awareness.
We suggest that body sensations ‘hold’ unhelpful thoughts via
co-emergence. Consequently, the coupling of unhelpful thoughts
and interoceptive experience is difficult to overcome when
standard cognitive reappraisal (Ellis, 1962; Beck, 1967) is not
accompanied by interoceptive exposure and acceptance. This
may better explain the difficulty in halting ruminative thinking
in anxiety and depression or intrusive obsessive thoughts in
OCD, for example. Unless the patient is able to focus on
the co-emerging body sensation with a degree of equanimity,
these dysfunctional thoughts are likely to persist. In support
of this view, the results of Füstös et al. (2013) showed that
interoceptive awareness facilitates cognitive reappraisal, which
was accompanied by reduced arousal. Although mindfulness
meditation does not include the typical style of cognitive
reappraisal used in cognitive therapy (Beck, 1967), it requires a
clear discernment of the mind-body interaction during emotional
distress and ‘holding in mind’ the notion that ‘there is no need to
react because it will pass.’ At least in the early stage of learning the
practice, the meditator reappraises the situation in these terms
and prevents the maintenance and proliferation of unhelpful
thoughts during the meditative experience.
Benefits of CMR Integration
It has been argued that the currently assumed causality of
relationship between diagnosis and therapy for conditions,
such as major depressive disorder, lacks scientific evidence
(Stojanov et al., 2011). The authors stress the lack of relationship
between therapeutic regimens and suspected pathogenesis,
and the inadequacy of tools to diagnose and delineate a
psychological disorder, among other obstacles to an evidence-
based psychiatry (see Stojanov et al., 2011, for comprehensive
discussion). In relation to these observations, there are several
advantages of having the CMR as a theoretical underpinning
for clinical intervention: the standard classification of emotional
disorders matters less to the clinician since the CMR improves
homogeneity of categories (a continuum of disequilibrium state);
therapy can be directed to core symptoms (unawareness of
co-emergence dynamics and interoceptive conditioning); and
markers and inquiry do inform core symptoms (since the
locus of reinforcement is interoception, the target of exposure
is necessarily the interoceptive experience occurring during
distressing events). For example, standard exposure to social
cues for people with social anxiety disorder without prior or
concurrent interoceptive exposure tends to yield poor results
(Mansell et al., 2003). A recent randomized controlled trial
(RCT) tested the generic assumption of the CMR—that recreating
an equilibrium state decreases psychopathology—by comparing
the efficacy of therapy methods that emphasize cognitive skills
with others that emphasize interoceptive and acceptance skills
to reduce OCD symptoms (Derakhtkar et al., unpublished).
These were Cognitive-Behavior Therapy (CBT), Metacognitive
Therapy (MCT), Acceptance Commitment Therapy (ACT), and
Mindfulness-integrated CBT (MiCBT). The results showed that
all four intervention decreased OCD symptoms in the short-
term relative to controls. However, only participants in the
MiCBT and ACT groups maintained their gains at follow-
up. No significant difference were found between MCT and
CBT in the long-term. Whereas CBT and MCT centered
their intervention on cognitive and metacognitive processing
(respectively), ACT and MiCBT emphasized mindfulness skills,
including interoceptive desensitization.
There is also increasing evidence that including interoceptive
desensitization to reduce the pathological effects of
disequilibrium state has transdiagnostic benefits. Several
RCTs have shown that MiCBT, which attempts to re-establish
equilibrium state transdiagnostically, is efficacious in treating
anxiety and depression in pregnant women (Yazdanimehr et al.,
2016) and in women with multiple sclerosis (Bahrani et al.,
2017), reducing perceived pain and increasing pain self-efficacy
in patients with breast cancer (Mozafari-Motlagh et al., 2019),
reducing anxiety and fatigue while improving sleep quality
in patients with Multiple Sclerosis (Pouyanfard et al., 2019),
and reducing sports-anxiety and pessimism, and increasing
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flow and adherence in competitive athletes (Scott-Hamilton
and Schutte, 2016; Scott-Hamilton et al., 2016). Other studies
successfully included specific MiCBT skills that promote the
equilibrium state in other mindfulness and acceptance-based
methods (e.g., Swain et al., 2013; Senderey, 2017). In a recent
RCT, Francis et al. (unpublished) examined the transdiagnostic
effects of re-establishing an equilibrium state through an 8-week
MiCBT program delivered in heterogenous groups of patients
with multimorbidity attending a psychology clinic. The results
showed significantly greater decrease in psychological distress
in the MiCBT group than in the treatment-as-usual group from
pre- to post-treatment and at 6-month follow-up across all
disorders included in the sample (N = 118). Mediation analysis
indicated that equanimity toward body sensations was the
most influential mediator of the primary outcome. This study
demonstrates the transdiagnostic efficacy of MiCBT and supports
its applications with heterogenous groups in community-based
primary mental health care.
Moreover, the transdiagnostic applicability of interoceptive
desensitization is not limited to its integration in CBT. Any
evidence-based approach in which interoceptive desensitization
is carefully implemented is likely to promote an equilibrium state,
which in turn can be learned if maintained over time through
training. For example, Cayoun et al. (2017) tested the CMR in 15
patients with chronic pain and multimorbidity. We hypothesized
that creating an ongoing equilibrium state through interoceptive
desensitization could assist patients to unlearn the central
sensitization effect of chronic pain. Participants were trained
in a self-guided 30-s mindfulness-based interoceptive exposure
task (MIET), which they were asked to apply to pain sensations
each time pain intensity increased during the day, repeatedly
over 15 days. Participants were asked to focus attention at the
center of the most intense body sensation as objectively as
possible and prevent experiential avoidance. Explained through
the CMR, they learned not to identify with pain sensations
(decreased self-referential evaluation of the stimulus and co-
emerging body sensations) and focused on four subcomponents
of interoceptive experience (mass, motion, temperature, and
cohesiveness) (increased sensory perception) while remaining
equanimous (decreased reactivity). The results showed a large
and significant reduction in pain anxiety (p = 0.001; d = 0.96),
pain duration (p = 0.01; d = 0.86), and pain intensity after
each 30-s exposure (p < 0.001; d = 1.37). These effects were
maintained, and some further improved, at 2-month follow-
up. This may be explained through brain correlates, as the
interoceptive network is closely connected to both the nociceptive
and affective networks (Khalsa et al., 2018). In a subsequent
RCT in experimental pain comparing the MIET to distraction
(Shires et al., 2019), the results showed that participants in the
MIET group were significantly more able to tolerate induced
pain than those in the distraction and control groups (p < 0.005,
d = 1.42 and p < 0.005, d = 1.06, respectively). Additionally, the
degree to which pain increased over the time course of the task
was also significantly more reduced in the MIET group, despite
higher initial pain levels. These results demonstrated that effort
to recreate an equilibrium state in the CMR, by disengaging the
habitual self-referential evaluative and reactive components while
engaging the sensory/interoceptive components, was sufficient
to decrease pain perception significantly more than distraction,
which is often used in standard CBT for coping with pain. The
Cayoun et al. (2017) MIET study also found that a significant
decrease in depression, anxiety and stress occurred after 2 weeks
of MIET implementation and even more so at 2-month follow-up
(p < 0.001; d = 0.81). We proposed that the MIET’s requirement
for continual use of interoceptive exposure produced increased
connectivity in insular functions and top-down inhibition of
ascending nociceptive signals and emotional reactivity. We
hypothesize that this method produced an immediate and
lasting pain reduction by creating an equilibrium state in the
information processing system, and that this can be equally
achieved with emotional disorders.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
The CMR presents several testable hypotheses related to both
behavior reinforcement and memory processes:
• Stimuli that are consciously or subconsciously evaluated as
being personally important co-emerge spontaneously with
body sensations, the role of which is twofold: evaluate the
significance of a stimulus to select an appropriate response,
and strengthen memory encoding and storage to improve
recall. This process appears to be neurologically subserved
by the salience network.
• The intensity of co-emerging body sensations is a function
of self-referential evaluation (e.g., the extent to which a
situation appears personally important).
• The hedonic tone (pleasant, unpleasant or neutral) of
co-emerging body sensations is a function of evaluative
agreeableness (i.e., agreeable evaluation of a stimulus co-
emerges with pleasurable body sensations and disagreeable
evaluation co-emerges with unpleasant body sensations).
• Reactive behavior is a consequence of interoceptive salience
and correlates positively with interoceptive intensity (i.e.,
the likelihood of an emotional reaction is predicted by
the intensity of co-emerging sensations). The importance
of this point is that a reaction is not a consequence
of a stimulus, which is why both sensitization and
desensitization can occur in the absence of a stimulus.
• If interoceptive change has occurred in the intended
direction following a response, that response is reinforced
(i.e., an avoidant reaction that decreases unpleasant body
sensation leads to future avoidance, and a craving reaction
that increases pleasant body sensations leads to increased
attachment and craving).
• In disequilibrium state, the processing of cognitive-
evaluative and learned behavioral output is
overemphasized, while awareness of sensory information,
including co-emergent interoception, is depleted (i.e.,
judging and reacting emotionally increase at the cost of
one’s normal ability to experience the senses, including
co-emerging body sensations).
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• This pattern of processing information can be learned with
sufficient repetition and become the ‘normal’ state of the
system (one becomes over-judgmental and over-reactive),
increasing the probability of mental health complications.
A chronic emotional disorder is the consequence and
representation of learned disequilibrium. This is correlated
with impaired insula function and salience network
disruption in mental health disorders.
• Co-emergent encoding assists survival by decreasing the
probability of memory decay and permits successful
memory retrieval of what is perceived as personally
important. ‘Relapsing’ into a distressing episode involves
the reactivation of a past disequilibrium state from memory,
and reconsolidation of the disorder’s memory trace.
Recurrent relapses are conceptualized as a consequence of
being unable to extinguish the co-emergent memory trace
of the disorder.
• Neutralizing reactivity to interoceptive cues by means of
equanimity improves therapy outcome (i.e., being aware
of body sensations while preventing reactivity during
exposure tasks is a more efficacious way of extinguishing
a response than focusing on the stimulus alone).
• Therapies that are more equipped to re-establish an
equilibrium state are likely to have a greater transdiagnostic
applicability (i.e., therapies that help patients neutralize
interoceptive conditioning and prevent identifying with
value-based judgmental thoughts are more efficacious
across a range of disorders than therapies that do not).
In summary, we propose that the basis for the maintenance of
numerous psychopathologies is the autonomic reconsolidation
of their memory trace through an over-identification with
co-emerging interoceptive experience, which renders the
extinguishment of the response difficult. This is conceptualized
through the CMR as a disequilibrium state between interactive
functions of information processing. We suggest that
mindfulness training is a skillset that can be used across disorders
to recreate equilibrium between functions.
The CMR provides a theoretical rationale for the use of
mindfulness practice across a broad range of disorders. Although
controlled studies provide support for this view, the practical
advantage of using this model in clinical practice can only
be ascertained through additional comparisons of therapies
that promote interoceptive exposure with those that do not.
Future studies are also needed to specifically investigate the role
of mindfulness in affecting memory reconsolidation associated
with mental health disorders. Moreover, studies are needed
to clarify the possibility that interoceptive exposure alone is
most helpful to patients who are most concerned about the
physical consequences of obvious somatic sensations (e.g., panic
symptoms, pain) compared to other consequences (e.g., fear
of failure). As it is done in MiCBT, for example, interoceptive
desensitization is initially part of mindfulness meditation and
followed by combined interoceptive and situational exposure
methods to achieve desensitization transdiagnostically. The
clinical field would also benefit from studies examining the
possibility that interoceptive desensitization facilitate situational
exposure, as it is found in MiCBT.
Using the CMR can greatly simplify and facilitate the case-
conceptualization of a clinical condition and assist in guiding
the direction of therapy. According to the CMR, since the
locus of reinforcement is interoception, using interoceptive
desensitization transdiagnostically is likely to yield good therapy
outcomes across a wide range of disorders. Mindfulness-based
techniques of body scanning that include equanimity promote
interoceptive desensitization and decrease the propensity for
emotional reactivity. The extant literature indicates that they
are also more likely to access and neutralize the emotional
load of cognitive schemas and help prevent relapse. Thus, using
interventions which integrate interoceptive desensitization frees
the clinician from the limitations posed by diagnostic-specific
therapies, and redirects attention to the patients’ disequilibrium
state and to the best possible ways of reducing its effects
through equanimity.
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